Washington Court of Appeals Affirms 41-Year Sentence for Defendant Who Committed Offenses at Age 16
Recent Cases in Law and Neuroscience, Curated by the Center for Law, Brain & Behavior and the Shen Neurolaw Lab with support from the Dana Foundation
A Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the 41-year sentence of D’Angelo Saloy on December 28, 2020. Saloy had appealed the sentence after his original 59-year sentence was reduced because of his youth at the time of the offenses. Saloy argued that the 41-year sentence remains a de facto life sentence.
In 2008, Saloy, age 16, shot two teenagers in a drive-by shooting, killing one. Saloy and the two victims were members of rival gangs.
In 2014, Saloy was convicted of first-degree murder and of attempted first-degree murder, and he was sentenced to 59 years for the offenses. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington “vacated his sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing on the grounds that his 712-month sentence constituted a de facto life sentence.” The trial court then conducted an evidentiary Miller hearing and resentenced Saloy to 41 years. Saloy appealed, asserting that this new sentence remains an unconstitutional de facto life sentence.
In its opinion, the appeals court cited State v. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 437, 387 P.3d 650 (2017), which held that a de facto life sentence should “trigger the need for a Miller hearing to consider what role youthfulness played in their crime and the appropriateness of a life without parole sentence.” However, in Ramos, no line was drawn for what sentence length specifically would constitute a de facto life sentence.
Saloy presented “several studies demonstrating how his lifespan may be adversely impacted by demographic and environmental factors” including a study “arguing that individuals experiencing four or more adverse childhood experiences (ACEs) are more likely to die prematurely.” The court found that the evidence “does not demonstrate that [Saloy] is likely to die before his release from prison” and held that his sentence was not a de facto life sentence.
Saloy also asserted that at his resentencing, the trial court “did not consider impulsivity as a feature of youth, but instead, whether his actions demonstrated impulsivity.” However, the appeals court found that the trial court “directly indicated it had considered the evidence related to juvenile neuroscience” when determining the length of Saloy’s sentence. Accordingly, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s sentence.
Citation: State v. Saloy, 2020 WL 7693140
Keywords: Washington, adolescent brain, Miller v. Alabama, de facto life sentence
This post is the 83rd post as part of an ongoing Center for Law, Brain & Behavior (CLBB) series tracking the latest developments in law and neuroscience cases. To see previous posts about recent cases, see the full case archive on the CLBB website. To see updates on legal scholarship, see the Neurolaw News, hosted by the MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience. This project is made possible through support of the Dana Foundation.
